Box-and-arrow explanations need not be more abstract than neuroscientific mechanism descriptions by Edoardo Datteri & Federico Laudisa
ORIGINAL RESEARCH ARTICLE
published: 22 May 2014
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00464
Box-and-arrow explanations need not be more abstract
than neuroscientiﬁc mechanism descriptions
Edoardo Datteri* and Federico Laudisa
Department of Human Sciences, University of Milano-Bicocca, Milano, Italy
Edited by:
Roberto Cordeschi, Sapienza
University of Rome, Italy
Reviewed by:
Mitchell Herschbach, California State
University Northridge, USA
Gualtiero Piccinini, University of
Missouri – St. Louis, USA
*Correspondence:
Edoardo Datteri, Department of
Human Sciences, University of
Milano-Bicocca, Piazza dell’Ateneo
Nuovo 1, Building U6, Room 4145,
20126 Milano, Italy
e-mail: edoardo.datteri@unimib.it
The nature of the relationship between box-and-arrow (BA) explanations and neuroscientiﬁc
mechanism descriptions (NMDs) is a key foundational issue for cognitive science. In this
article we attempt to identify the nature of the constraints imposed by BA explanations
on the formulation of NMDs. On the basis of a case study about motor control, we
argue that BA explanations and NMDs both identify regularities that hold in the system,
and that these regularities place constraints on the formulation of NMDs from BA
analyses, and vice versa. The regularities identiﬁed in the two kinds of explanation play
a crucial role in reasoning about the relationship between them, and in justifying the
use of neuroscientiﬁc experimental techniques for the empirical testing of BA analyses
of behavior. In addition, we make claims concerning the similarities and differences
between BA analyses and NMDs. First, we argue that both types of explanation
describe mechanisms. Second, we propose that they differ in terms of the theoretical
vocabulary used to denote the entities and properties involved in the mechanism and
engaging in regular, mutual interactions. On the contrary, the notion of abstractness,
deﬁned as omission of detail, does not help to distinguish BA analyses from NMDs:
there is a sense in which BA analyses are more detailed than NMDs. In relation to
this, we also focus on the nature of the extra detail included in NMDs and missing
from BA analyses, arguing that such detail does not always concern how the system
works. Finally, we propose reasons for doubting that BA analyses, unlike NMDs, may
be considered “mechanism sketches.” We have developed these views by critically
analyzing recent claims in the philosophical literature regarding the foundations of cognitive
science.
Keywords: functional models, neuroscientific explanation, mechanisms, levels of analysis in neuroscience,
regularities in neuroscience
INTRODUCTION
Explanations in the behavioral sciences take on a wide variety of
styles. Quite often, especially at the early stages of their discov-
ery, behavioral mechanisms are described without reference to
brain areas or neural activity. The system is broken down into
a number of interconnected components, each assumed to play
an active part in the generation of the behavior to be explained.
But no mention is made of what brain area, if any, corresponds
to each component. For example, studies on motor control often
postulate the existence of a “feedback controller” component in
the system that produces motor commands on the basis of trajec-
tory errors, without specifying which part of the target nervous
system is presumed to perform this activity. When system com-
ponents are only characterized on the basis of the activity they
perform in the generation of the behavior to be explained, this is
often referred to as a “box-and-arrow” (BA from now on) analysis
of the system. An example of a BA analysis of motor control is
shown in Figure 1. However, other behavioral mechanisms are
described in terms of anatomically identiﬁed brain areas and the
associated neural activities. For example, visually guided motor
control in humans is thought to involve areas such as the visual
cortex, the brain stem, the cerebellum and others. Similarly to
BA explanations1, such neuroscientiﬁc mechanism descriptions
(from now on NMDs) are often represented in box-and-arrow
format in scientiﬁc papers (see Figure 3 for an example); in con-
trast with what we have termed BA analyses, however, each box
stands for a particular brain area or portion of the nervous sys-
tem. Some brain areas may be linked to an activity performed
within the framework of the behavior to be explained (e.g., in
navigation when the hippocampus is said to hold a representation
of space), but this is not always the case: a part of the nervous
system may feature in an NMD even when the precise activity
it carries out within the framework of the target behavior is not
made explicit.
The theoretical vocabulary used in these two kinds of mod-
els is different, at least prima facie2. NMDs identify components
and their organization using the language of neuroscience, which
includes terms denoting brain areas, and expressions such as
“neural activity,” “inhibitory connection,” “ﬁring rate” and so
1The expressions “BA analysis” and “BA explanation” will be used interchangeably
in this article.
2The intended meaning of the expression “theoretical vocabulary” will be clari-
ﬁed in Section “The Relationship Between Functional Models and Neuroscientiﬁc
Mechanism Descriptions.”
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FIGURE 1 | A box-and-arrow model of motor control (adapted fromWolpert et al., 1998).
on. In contrast BA explanations identify components and their
organization in terms of a representational or information-
processing language. For example, “feedback controllers” are
said to produce internal representations of motor commands
on the basis of a representation of trajectory error produced by
other components. Yet most neuroscientists and philosophers
of neuroscience assume that BA analyses and NMDs may be
related to, and place constraints on, each other in some cases.
Often, explanation of a behavior starts from the formulation
of a BA analysis of the target system. Later, this BA analysis
is taken as a basis on which to formulate an NMD by seek-
ing out neural components that perform the activities speciﬁed
in the BA analysis. In other cases, one starts with a NMD
featuring interconnected brain areas, going on to identify the
speciﬁc activities carried out by each: the NMD, in these cases,
is taken as a basis on which to formulate a BA model of the
system.
Now, it is one thing to assume that some kind of relationship
holds between the two types of explanation, but quite another to
clarify the nature of this relationship. What kind of constraints
do BA analyses place on the formulation of NMDs, and vice
versa? This is a question of great importance for neuroscientiﬁc
research. Understanding the nature of these constraints would
provide criteria for deriving NMDs from BA analyses in a prin-
cipled way, and for testing the latter according to the empirical
methods of the neurosciences. It would also contribute signiﬁ-
cantly to unifying branches of behavioral science, such as cognitive
psychology (which typically adopts forms of BA analysis) andbasic
neuroscience, whose theoretical vocabulary may appear prima
facie unrelated to each other. The aim of the present article is
to take some further steps towards the formulation of such cri-
teria on the basis of a close analysis of a case study on motor
control in humans, and by critical examination of views recently
expressed in the philosophical literature on the foundations of the
cognitive sciences (Piccinini and Craver, 2011; Levy and Bechtel,
2013).
In the selected case study, a BA analysis of motor control
was formulated, whose functional structure was claimed to cor-
respond to the structure of a particular mechanism description
couched in the vocabulary of neuroscience (Wolpert et al., 1998).
The BA explanation and the NMD are described in Sections “On
the Structure of Box-and-Arrow Models in Neuroscience” and
“On the Structure Of Neuroscientiﬁc Mechanism Descriptions,”
respectively. In Section “The Relationship Between Functional
Models and Neuroscientiﬁc Mechanism Descriptions” we argue
that, in both cases, a number of regularities were claimed to
hold in the system, although different theoretical vocabulary
was used to denote the entities and properties involved in these
regularities. We further argue that these regularities played a
crucial role in justifying the correspondence between the two
explanations. Indeed, the formulation of an NMD proceeded
by searching for neural groups whose activities conformed to
the relationships expressed in the BA analysis. Thus, the cor-
respondence between the two explanations seemed to consist,
in the authors’ view, of a correspondence between the regulari-
ties expressed in each, while the BA analysis placed constraints
on neuroscientiﬁc research given that it postulated a number
of regularities to be sought out in the neural activity of the
system.
In Section “The Relationship Between Functional Models and
NeuroscientiﬁcMechanismDescriptions,”we also take the selected
case study to support a number of claims about the structural
similarities and differences between BA analyses and NMDs. As
far as the similarities are concerned we argue, consistently with
what has been claimed, amongst others, by Piccinini and Craver
(2011) that both explanations describe mechanisms, given that
they refer to system components that interact with each other in
a regular fashion3. In relation to the structural differences, we
examine the claim that BA analyses are less detailed (Piccinini
and Craver, 2011) or more abstract (Levy and Bechtel, 2013) than
NMDs. We suggest that BA analyses may provide details that are
missing from NMDs, namely, details on the representational roles
played by certain neural groups, and that for this reason they may
be said to be richer, or more detailed than NMDs. For the same
reasons we also propose that the notion of abstractness, deﬁned
as “omission of detail” (Levy and Bechtel, 2013), does not help to
deﬁne the difference between BA explanations andNMDs. Rather,
3For the purposes of the present paper, we provisionally accept the analysis of
neuroscientiﬁc mechanisms provided by Craver (2007).
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the two kinds of explanation differ in relation to the theoretical
vocabulary they use to denote system components. By changing
theoretical vocabulary, and re-deﬁning BA components in neuro-
scientiﬁc terms, one does not add crucial details about how the
mechanism works: one simply describes the same boxes with dif-
ferent vocabulary. A way to add details on how the system works
is, rather, to iterate mechanistic analysis on the components of
a previously formulated system. This process, often referred to
as decomposition in the epistemological literature on the cognitive
sciences (Bechtel and Richardson, 1993), is to be viewed as distinct
from the process of changing the theoretical vocabulary used to
describe a mechanism.
We then examine more closely the claim, made by Piccinini
and Craver (2011), that BA analyses are elliptical or incomplete
versions of neuroscientiﬁc mechanism descriptions – mechanism
sketches, in these authors’ terminology – insofar as they leave out
crucial details on how the systemworks.We comment on this view
by arguing that the details provided by NMDs and lacking in BA
explanations need not concern how the systemworks. And we also
suggest more general reasons for doubting that BA analyses may
be considered elliptical versions of NMDs.
Let us begin this discussion by outlining the structure of the BA
analysis of motor control proposed by Wolpert et al. (1998).
ON THE STRUCTURE OF BOX-AND-ARROW MODELS IN
NEUROSCIENCE
The scientiﬁc question addressed by Wolpert et al. (1998) is to
understand how human beings control their movements along
a desired trajectory – for example, how they successfully move
a hand towards a speciﬁc object, or move an eye to track a
portion of the visual environment. The idea proposed by the
authors, and expressed in the BA analysis shown in Figure 1, is as
follows.
A representation of the desired trajectory is available to the
system. Then two components, the “feedback controller” and
the “inverse model,” produce two motor commands – termed
feedback and feedforward motor commands, respectively – that
are combined before being sent, as a ﬁnal motor command, to
the “controlled object” (e.g., arm muscles) for execution. Both
components produce motor commands, yet they there is a key
difference between them. The “feedback controller” produces a
motor command on the basis of “trajectory error,” i.e., on the
basis of the difference between (1) the representation of the
desired trajectory, and (2) the representation of the “actual tra-
jectory” followed by the controlled object. This is the classical
cybernetic negative-feedback principle (Rosenblueth et al., 1943),
which is applied in many self-regulation devices (e.g., in ther-
mostats). A major issue with such feedback-based control loops
is the time required to receive feedback information on the actual
trajectory. Sensory pathways are very delayed in humans, and a
control mechanism based purely on feedback would make the
system move too slowly or make too many errors. This was the
main reason leading the authors to postulate a sort of short-
cut, represented by the “inverse model” module. The function
of this module is to generate motor commands on the basis
of a representation of the desired trajectory only, with no sen-
sory information available (intuitively, we use an inverse model
when moving in our house in the dark). Feedforward motor com-
mands are generated much more rapidly than the feedback ones,
because they do not need to wait for the arrival and processing
of sensory information. When a feedback command is available,
it is combined with the feedforward command as earlier stated;
otherwise, the system executes the feedforward command only,
enabling itself to follow the desired trajectory within a reasonable
time-frame.
Clearly, the “inverse model” must be trained before being
able to generate the appropriate motor commands. The train-
ing signal consists of the representation of motor command error,
generated on the basis of trajectory error (we correct our inter-
nal model of the house whenever we bump into a wall or piece
of furniture that we erroneously believed to be farther away
from us).
As mentioned in the Introduction, the authors of this study
also formulated a neuroscientiﬁc mechanism description, dis-
cussed in detail in the next section, which was deliberately made
to correspond with the structure described so far. As a basis for
understanding the relationship between the two types of anal-
ysis, it is worth discussing some aspects of the BA explanation
as described here. This explanation implies that there is some-
thing in the system which can represent desired trajectories. The
system can also represent feedback and feedforward motor com-
mands. Indeed, as explained before, the ﬁnal motor command is
a combination of feedback and feedforward motor commands:
a plausible interpretation of this claim would be that the system
has internal representations of the two commands, which are then
combined into a third representation (the ﬁnal motor command)
driving the effector organs. In addition, the BA analysis refers
to a number of functional components, including the “inverse
model” and the “feedback controller,” presumed to be involved
in motor control. These components are parts of the target sys-
tem that are assumed to fulﬁll distinct functions within motor
control.
This raises the question of what differentiates each component
from the others. What is an “inverse model?” The authors of the
study suggested that an inverse model is a component that trans-
forms the desired movement trajectory of the controlled object
into the motor commands required to attain this movement goal.
That is to say that, by claiming that the system has an “inverse
model,” the authors claimed that there is something in the system
that establishes a regular relationship between desired trajectories
and feedforward motor commands. This regular relationship was
not precisely deﬁned in their theory, apart from the claim that
each desired trajectory is mapped onto the motor command that
would make the system follow that trajectory4. Similarly, in sug-
gesting that the system has a “feedback controller,” the authors
claimed that there is something in the system that establishes
a regularity between trajectory errors (which, in turn, depend
on the difference between desired and actual trajectories) and
feedback motor commands: feedback controllers produce motor
4More precisely, the regularity associated with the “inverse model” module in the
BA diagram links three representations to one other, as shown in Figure 1: the
feedforward motor command depends on the desired trajectory and on the motor
command error, which intermittently trains the motor apparatus’ internal model.
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commands that have the effect of reducing trajectory error5. These
deﬁnitions are rather vague, but they nevertheless impose restric-
tions on the set of possible regularities associated with the“inverse
model” and “feedback controller” components. The other func-
tional components are associated with other regularities. To sum
up, this BA model suggests that the system possesses a num-
ber of internal representations among which certain regularities
hold.
Note that the BA analysis makes no claim about how each com-
ponent establishes the corresponding regularity. As often noted
in the philosophy of cognitive science, box-and-arrow analysis
may be iterated to obtain ﬁner-grained, more detailed BA anal-
yses of the same behavior. See for example Figure 2, in which a
purely notional BA subanalysis of the “feedback controller” com-
ponent (not included in Wolpert et al., 1998) is shown. Three
components are added, each of which establishes a regularity
among additional intermediate representations. The relationship
between the BA analysis described above, which wemay call M for
short, and the richer analysis M′, in which one or more functional
components of M are further analyzed and broken down into a
box-and-arrow structure, is often deﬁned through appeal to the
notion of decomposition (Rosenblueth and Wiener, 1945; Cum-
mins, 1985; Bechtel and Richardson, 1993). Clearly, M′ may be
further decomposed via an even ﬁner-grained analysis; this pro-
cess leads to the formulation of a decomposition hierarchy of BA
explanations.
It is worth stressing here two aspects of BA decomposition
that we come back to in the ensuing discussion. First, by decom-
posing a BA analysis, one obtains a richer BA analysis of the
same system, in which further details are added on how the
system is thought to work. For example, M is silent on a par-
ticular aspect of the functioning of the system, namely on how
the “feedback controller” works, simply stating that the “feedback
controller” component establishes a regular relationship between
5The “trajectory error” and the “feedback motor command” representations may
well be regarded as the input and the output of the“feedback controller”component,
respectively. However, the use of these terms, although consistent with the present
analysis,would require an additional account of whatmakes something an“input”or
an “output” of a BA component – an account which may enable one to understand,
e.g., why the “trajectory error” is more properly regarded as an input rather than
as an output of the “feedback controller” component. Such an account is not really
required for the purposes of the present article. For this reason we provisionally
avoid the use of the terms “input” and “output” and only claim that, according to
the BA analysis, the “feedback controller” is a component that establishes a regular
relationship between the two representations.
FIGURE 2 | A model of the “feedback controller” component of the BA
model.
two representations. M′ adds details on how this component
works, thus adding information on the functioning of the tar-
get system. Second, decomposition does not imply a change in
the theoretical vocabulary used to describe the organization of
the system – for example, speciﬁcally with regard to living sys-
tems, it does not imply a shift to the vocabulary of neuroscience –
or vice versa. This is particularly evident in BA explanations for-
mulated in computer science, in which components establishing
regularities between system representations (typically expressed
as functions in a given programming language) are analyzed
into additional components (sub-functions) that establish regu-
larities connecting additional system representations. Similarly,
BA components in the study of cognition are often analyzed
(decomposed) by postulating cascades of transformations among
intermediate representations. Such a decomposition process does
not lead to a change in vocabulary: it simply leads to another,
richer, BA explanation. The process of decomposing a BA expla-
nation must be kept conceptually distinct from the process of
shifting to another theoretical vocabulary. Later in the paper,
we focus on this distinction, arguing that the “translation” of
a BA explanation into a neuroscientiﬁc MD does not necessar-
ily lead to the addition of crucial details on the working of the
system.
Furthermore, this distinction enables us to separate two
methodological issues, both related to the more general prob-
lem of understanding the relationships between functional and
mechanistic models in neuroscience. One of these issues is how
to characterize the decomposition relationship, that is to say,
the relationship holding between an explanation M and another
explanation M′ obtained by decomposing from M and expressed
using the same theoretical vocabulary. In other words, the issue
of identifying the criteria used by scientists to transform pre-
vious explanations of a system into richer ones adding crucial
details on the working of the system. A different issue is that
of characterizing the relationship holding between two explana-
tions of the same behavior formulated using different theoretical
vocabularies. The case study analyzed here, as discussed in the
next section, provides insights that help to address both ques-
tions, although this article is more strongly focused on the second
issue.
ON THE STRUCTURE OF NEUROSCIENTIFIC MECHANISM
DESCRIPTIONS
Figure 3 shows a diagram formulated to explain how we6 con-
trol our eye movements to track moving portions of a visual
scene (the so-called ocular following response or OFR). This
motor control function cannot be fulﬁlled by feedback con-
trol only, given that visual feedback in humans is too delayed
to enable efﬁcient control of eye movements. The combina-
tion of feedback and inverse control, according to the prin-
ciple described in the previous section, is a more promising
approach to explaining this ability. A neuroscientiﬁc explanation
6This study actually examined monkey OFR, and the neuroscientiﬁc mechanism
description discussed below refers to areas of the monkey brain. However, the
authors suggested that this mechanism description could also shed light on the OFR
mechanism in humans. Discussion of the reasons for such a generalization is beyond
the scope of the present article.
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FIGURE 3 | A neuroscientific mechanism description for ocular-following
reflex behavior, adapted from (Wolpert et al., 1998). AOS: accessory optic
system; PT: pretectum; NOT: nucleus of optic tract; EOMN: extra-ocular
motor neurons; LGN: lateral geniculate nucleus; STS: superior temporal
sulcus; MT: middle temporal area; MST: medial superior temporal area; DLPN:
dorsolateral pontine nucleus; VPFL: ventral paraﬂocculus.
of OFR was formulated by Wolpert et al. (1998) so as to
correspond to the BA diagram represented in Figure 1. In
particular, the authors claimed that the “inverse model” com-
ponent corresponded to the component labeled as the ventral
paraﬂocculus of the cerebellar cortex (VPFL) and to a num-
ber of additional components, as discussed below. The “feed-
back controller” corresponded to a set of components including
the retina, the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN), and por-
tions of the visual cortex. Other components mentioned in
their mechanistic analysis, as later discussed, cannot be eas-
ily mapped onto the BA explanation outlined in the previous
section.
A question of primary importance is how the authors justi-
ﬁed the claim that the two explanations corresponded to each
other, albeit partially. Let us address this question by focusing
on the “inverse model” component. The authors claimed that
“the VPFL is the major site of the inverse dynamics model of
the eye for OFR” (p. 341). This amounted to claiming that the
VPFL is responsible for the fact that the activity of a neural
group, which we call B for the moment, depends on the activ-
ity of another neural group A in the following regular fashion:
the activity of B drives eye movements along the trajectory rep-
resented in A. In other words, by claiming that the VPFL served
as an inverse model for the eye, Wolpert et al. (1998) were sug-
gesting that the VPFL was responsible for a regular connection
of the “inverse model” type between the activity of two neural
groups. Should no neural activity in the brain be dependent in
this way on a neural representation of desired trajectories, no
inverse model would be claimed to be in the brain. The authors
justiﬁed the claim that “the VPFL is the major site of the inverse
dynamics model of the eye for OFR” by providing neuroscien-
tiﬁc evidence for such a regularity. Note that an engineer would
argue in the same way that an electromechanical electrical circuit
included an inverse model, that is to say, by showing that the elec-
trical activity at some point of a circuit depended on the electrical
activity at another point of the circuit in accordance with “inverse
model” regularity. In both cases, the fact that the BA analysis spec-
iﬁes regularities holding between parts of the system is crucial
to understanding the nature of the relationship between BA and
neuroscientiﬁc (or electromechanical) explanations of the same
behavior.
The authors presented some interesting, albeit far from deci-
sive, empirical support for their claim. First of all, the activity of
certain VPFL cells – the Purkinje cells, often considered the out-
put of the cerebellum – has been found to be regularly connected
with eye movements. In particular, it is known that the activity of
the Purkinje cells displays two types of spike, namely simple and
complex spikes (SS and CS from now on; see Kandel et al., 2000).
The SS are single action potentials. They occur at a relatively high
frequency and have been found to correlate with certain aspects
of eye movement. According to Wolpert et al. (1998), they may
drive eyemovementswithoutwaiting for the low-frequency arrival
of sensory information, thus serving as feedfoward motor com-
mands. Motor correlation has not been found in other neurons
projecting from vision-related areas to the cerebellum, namely in
the neurons of the dorsolateral pontine nucleus (DLPN) and the
medial superior temporal (MST) area. In the authors’ view, given
the absence of motor correlation and the connections with visual
areas, these cells may “provide the desired trajectory information”
to the cerebellum. Let us turn now to cerebellar CS. These are
large-amplitude spikes followed by bursts of smaller action poten-
tials. In addition they occur at a very low frequency (about 1–3
per second) and, similarly to the SS, display high correlation with
eye movements. The authors suggested that the occurrence of a
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CS may signal the moment in which a motor command derived
from feedback analysis (thus highly delayed, consistently with the
low frequency of CS) interferes with the activity of the Purkinje
cells and trains the inverse model. This relationship is shown in
the BA diagram by the arrow connecting feedback motor com-
mands with the inverse model. These empirical ﬁndings were
taken by the authors as a basis for conjecturing that “the VPFL
is themajor site of the inverse dynamics model of the eye for OFR”
(p. 341).
At the time of publication of Wolpert et al. (1998), the formu-
lation of an NMD for OFR behavior was still at the early stages
of development. However, on the basis of Wolpert et al.’s (1998)
report, it is reasonable to believe that they were trying to iden-
tify a “neuroscientiﬁc version” of the regularities postulated by the
BA analysis in the neural activity of the system. These regularities
played a crucial role in justifying the correspondence between the
BA analysis and theNMD: theVPFL, for example, was conjectured
to be the neural site of the “inverse model” component as it sup-
posedly establishes a regularity of the inverse-model type among
entities and properties denoted with neuroscientiﬁc vocabulary,
that is to say, between the neural activity of two neural groups.
The justiﬁcation was sought in the fact that the same regulari-
ties, expressed in different theoretical vocabularies, are found in
the system. If no reference were made to the regularities postu-
lated by the BA explanation – or if these regularities were speciﬁed
in a qualitative and imprecise way, or BA components were only
described in terms of textual expressions such as “feedforward
controller” – it would not be clear how to relate the BA expla-
nation to a neuroscientiﬁc mechanism description of the same
system.
Note that, according to the regulative principle proposed here,
a neuroscientiﬁc mechanism description may be formulated from
a BA analysis by mapping each functional regularity onto a neural
regularity, without adding components. This is the case of neu-
roscientiﬁc mechanism descriptions which reproduce the boxes
and arrows of a BA analysis of the same system, while adding
an indication of the neural structure subserving each functional
role. In many cases, however, the shift from a BA explanation to
a neuroscientiﬁc one is accompanied by a proliferation of neural
structures.
This is also the case of the mechanism description analyzed
here. Some neural structures internal to the VPFL are repre-
sented in the diagram. And various areas, such as the inferior
olive and the previously mentioned AOS, PT, and NOT, are not
easily mapped onto the BA explanation. Such a proliferation can
result from a decomposition process, analogous to the process
described in the previous section. We have pointed out that BA
components may be analyzed into other BA sub-components,
organized so as to produce the corresponding regularity (see
Figure 2). By decomposing explanation M one obtains a richer
explanation M′, which includes additional regularities internal
to each component expressed in the same theoretical vocabulary.
Similarly, the components of a neuroscientiﬁc mechanism may
be analyzed into subcomponents, expressed using the theoreti-
cal vocabulary of neuroscience, and organized so as to produce
the corresponding regularity. For example, when analyzing the
internal VPFL cerebellar circuitry, additional regularities deﬁning
sub-components of the cerebellum may be identiﬁed: the richer
neuroscientiﬁc mechanism is obtained by decomposition of the
initial model. A case of decomposition in the study described
here concerns the inferior olive, the AOS, the PT and the NOT,
which the authors believed to be crucially involved in transform-
ing the representation of the desired trajectory from sensory to
motor coordinates, thus contributing to the inverse model trans-
formation. Decomposition adds detail on the inner working of
model components – thus, it provides extra detail about how
the system is supposed to work – and for this reason it often
marks an advance in the study of the modeled system7. How-
ever, it is worth stressing that it is one thing to “translate” a
BA analysis into a neuroscientiﬁc mechanism description, and
another to decompose the latter in order to obtain a more detailed
model; and that – as often acknowledged in the philosophical
literature – both BA explanations and NMDs may be decom-
posed, although they are expressed using different theoretical
vocabularies.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FUNCTIONAL MODELS AND
NEUROSCIENTIFIC MECHANISM DESCRIPTIONS
Let us sum up the claims made so far. In the case study ana-
lyzed here, a BA explanation and a NMD were introduced,
each outlining a number of components supposedly involved in
motor control, and describing their regular interactions. Notably,
the neuroscientiﬁc mechanism description was claimed to “cor-
respond” to the BA explanation. How did the authors justify
this claim? As suggested in the previous sections, a key role
in providing such a justiﬁcation was played by the regulari-
ties expressed by the two explanations8: the authors seemed to
follow the regulative principle according to which a BA anal-
ysis and a neuroscientiﬁc mechanism description “correspond”
to each other to the extent that they display the same regu-
larities, even though they are expressed in terms of different
theoretical vocabularies. Indeed, the authors’ search for the neu-
ral structures corresponding to each BA component consisted of
7As discussed in Footnote 14, this is not to say that decomposition leads always
to better explanations. We wish to remain entirely neutral in relation to what
level of explanation, or which theoretical vocabulary, is more suited to the pur-
pose of explaining adaptive behavior or answering speciﬁc why-questions about it.
Our point solely concerns the structural relationship between BA explanations and
NMDs.
8Whether it is possible to have a theory of what we mean by a “regularity” in the
ﬁeld of neurosciences is, to a large extent, an open question. Woodward’s notion of
“invariance under interventions” (Woodward, 2003, 2010) is a useful starting point
to address this issue. Many authors – including Craver (2007) – have claimed that
neuroscientiﬁc generalizations are fragile and exception-ridden, given that they are
subject to a formidable number of boundary conditions. This claim may be taken
to pose a serious problem for present analysis: if no robust (as opposed to fragile)
generalization may be found in the neural structure of the system, how can the
correspondence between the BA explanation and the NMD be justiﬁed according
to the regulative principle proposed here? This is a legitimate question, needing
to be addressed by further analysis; nevertheless, we believe that the regulative
principle put forward here is reasonable. Indeed, in our opinion, it is a matter of
fact that Wolpert et al. (1998) identiﬁed regularities in the neural system. These
regularities were claimed to be robust enough to be found in different individuals
and at different times. Clarifying how neuroscientiﬁc generalizations may be taken
as sufﬁciently robust to license prediction and explanation, despite being subject to
a multitude of boundary conditions, is in our opinion an important aim for the
epistemological analysis of neuroscience; see the discussion in Datteri and Laudisa
(2012).
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a search for the regularities characterizing the component, as
outlined in the BA analysis, in anatomically connected regions
of the brain. What makes something an “inverse model” is the
fact that it establishes a particular regularity internal to the sys-
tem, and what makes something a neural structure serving as
an “inverse model” is the fact that it establishes a regularity of
the inverse-model type among the activity of different neural
groups9.
This provides a tentative answer to the key issue addressed in
this article: what kind of constraints do BA analyses place on the
formulation of NMDs, and vice versa? The BA analysis imposes
constraints on the formulation of the NMDby postulating a num-
ber of regularities to be sought for in the neural activities of the
system. Vice versa, the NMD constrains the space of the possible
BA analyses of the system by postulating a number of neural reg-
ularities. Suppose that the study of a particular aspect of motor
control in animals starts from the formulation of an NMD – pos-
sibly via the detection of correlations among the ﬁring of different
neural groups. Suppose, in addition, that one of these correla-
tions takes a “feedback controller” form – e.g., the ﬁring of neural
group B drives muscles so as to reduce ﬁring of neural group A.
In that situation it would be reasonable to suppose that the sys-
tem has a representation of the motor error (the ﬁring of group
A) and is able to produce an appropriate motor command to
reduce motor error – in simpler terms, that it has a feedback
controller. Should the regularity be different (for example, should
the ﬁring of A increase over time instead of tending to 0), one
would not suppose that the system had a negative feedback con-
troller (it might be thought to have a positive feedback controller
instead).
The selected case study also provides a useful basis for assess-
ing the structural similarities and differences between BA analyses
and NMDs. As far as the similarities are concerned, both explana-
tions specify a set of regularities supposedly holding in the system,
though expressed using different theoretical vocabularies. And for
this reason, consistently with Piccinini and Craver (2011), they
both describe mechanisms. Indeed, if we are willing to consider
the structure represented in Figure 3 as a mechanism descrip-
tion, why not view BA analyses in the same way? Both types of
explanation list a number of components suggested to be respon-
sible for the behavior to be explained, and – more crucially –
both specify the regular interactions holding among system com-
ponents via a number of generalizations. The main difference
between the two lies in the theoretical vocabulary used, but it is not
clear why the choice of a particular theoretical vocabulary should
determine whether or not to deﬁne something as a “mechanism
description.”
As already stated, one of the major differences between the
two mechanisms concerns the theoretical vocabulary used. The
expression “theoretical vocabulary” is used here to denote a set
9Anatomical considerations guide the authors in selecting the regularities which
may play a part in the explanation. Indeed, only the regularities holding among
anatomically connected parts of the system are typically included in the description
of an explanatory mechanism. This is consistent with the view proposed here: to
claim that neuroscientiﬁc mechanism descriptions formulate regularities holding
in the system does not mean to claim that any regularity may be included in a
description of a mechanism.
of terms used in a particular discipline, or in a particular area
of research, to express scientiﬁc theories. Statements regarding
the neural activity of particular areas of the nervous system,
and the anatomical connections among brain areas, are couched
in the theoretical vocabulary of the neurosciences (which includes
terms such as “neuron,” “neural activity,” “cerebellum,” “brain,”
and so on). These terms are not used in what we refer to here
as BA explanations10. As often pointed out in the philosophi-
cal literature on cognitive science, the theoretical vocabulary of
BA explanations distinctively includes the term “representation.”
Indeed, many BA explanations – including the explanation con-
sidered here – assume that the target system has a number of
representations. And the various functional components, as in
the case discussed here, are typically deﬁned by appeal to these
representations. Saying that the system has a “feedback controller”
component is tomake a rather amorphous claim, unless that com-
ponent is deﬁned more precisely as a component establishing a
regular relationship between different representations held by the
system. The notion of representation plays a key role in deﬁning
the components of a BA analysis and, therefore, in deﬁning a BA
explanation.
Do BA analyses and NMDs (also) differ in that the former
are less detailed or more abstract than the latter? Such a position
has been taken, amongst others, by Piccinini and Craver (2011),
who propose that “functional and mechanistic explanations are
not distinct and autonomous from one another precisely because
functional analysis, properly constrained, is a kind of mecha-
nistic explanation – an elliptical mechanistic explanation” (284).
These authors call such elliptical mechanistic explanations mech-
anism sketches; therefore, in their view, functional explanations
are mechanism sketches. BA analysis is a type of functional analy-
sis, they propose, because it identiﬁes components on the basis of
the functional role they play in the framework of the behavior to
be explained11. Piccinini and Craver’s (2011) identiﬁcation of BA
10According to the deﬁnition proposed in Section “Introduction,” BA explanations
do not specify which parts of the target nervous system are presumed to perform
the activities mentioned there. For this reason NMDs are not included in the class
of BA explanations, even though (as noted before) NMDs are often represented in
a box-and-arrow format in scientiﬁc papers. BA and NMDs, as deﬁned here, differ
in relation to the theoretical vocabulary used to denote system components. This
is not to say that the use of representational terms is incompatible with the use of
neuroscientiﬁc terms in the same explanation. Indeed, in the course of scientiﬁc
discovery, researchers often formulate “mixed” explanations using both represen-
tational and neuroscientiﬁc terms. An example can be found in our case study
(Wolpert et al., 1998). After describing the BA explanation, the authors propose an
analysis of motor control (Figure 1B at p. 339) which provides information on the
neural localization of the “inverse model” component only. This analysis, presented
by the authors as an intermediate stage in the formulation of an NMD from the
initial BA explanation, uses representational and neuroscientiﬁc terms. Nothing, in
the view proposed here, rules out the possibility of formulating mixed models of
that kind. Rather, the analysis proposed here – focused on the relationship holding
between non-mixed BA explanations and NMDs – may also contribute to under-
standing howmixed analyses are formulated from explanations of the former or the
latter kind. Indeed, there are reasons to believe that the mixed analysis in (Wolpert
et al., 1998) is obtained from the BA explanation by applying the criteria discussed
here to one component only, i.e., by searching for an“inverse-model” type regularity
in the neural structure of the target system, and provisionally ignoring the other BA
components.
11We consider Piccinini and Craver’s (2011) views to be relevant to the main points
made here, given that we believe that they would classify the analysis represented
in Figure 1 as a functional analysis. Indeed, each of its components is labeled
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analyses with mechanism sketches is consistent with their broader
view that BA analyses impose constraints on the formulation
of neuroscientiﬁc mechanism descriptions. We agree with this
hypothesis, but not with the hypothesis that BA analyses are ellip-
tical or incomplete mechanism descriptions, for the following
reasons.
As alreadydiscussed, both functional andneuroscientiﬁcmech-
anism descriptions specify a number of regularities occurring
in the system. They differ in terms of the vocabulary used to
denote the entities and properties involved in these regularities.
Does a change in theoretical vocabulary entail a gain in com-
pleteness? One might answer in the afﬁrmative, in light of the
fact that the BA analysis does not convey information regard-
ing the brain areas and neural groups underlying the various
representations held by the system. The BA explanation, for
example, does not specify what neural groups fulﬁll the role
of representing desired trajectories or feedforward motor com-
mands. This may lead one to believe that the BA explanation
is less detailed than the NMD. However, it is also true that BA
explanations convey information which are absent in NMDs.
Indeed, in principle, NMDs need not provide information on the
representational functions of the neural groups involved in the
mechanism. They may simply identify neural components and
deﬁne their regular interaction, without claiming, for example,
that the ﬁring activity of neural groupA is responsible for, encodes,
or serves as, a representation of something. Functional infor-
mation about the system’s representational abilities is explicitly
provided by BA explanations but may be missing from NMDs12.
Therefore, BA explanations may convey details that are lacking
in NMDs. For these reasons, one may legitimately view NMDs
as “more detailed” than BA explanations only by appropriately
restricting the term “detail” to refer to “neural detail.” But the
awarding of such an epistemic privilege to neural details requires
justiﬁcation.
These considerations may also be applied to Levy and Bech-
tel’s (2013) views on abstractness, deﬁned as “omission of detail.”
BA explanations omit details provided by NMDs, and vice versa.
For this reason, they cannot be ordered on a scale of abstract-
ness without being explicit about the nature of the details at stake
(BA explanations are more abstract than NMDs as far as neu-
ral details are concerned, and NMDs are more abstract than BA
explanations as far as representational details are concerned)13.
using an expression that denotes a functional role, i.e., “feedback controller” and
“inverse model.” And the notion of representation, used to characterize the various
components, is functional by deﬁnition.
12This is not to say that NMDs are not functional. Indeed many authors, including
Piccinini and Craver (2011), have convincingly shown that NMDs are functional
according to various interpretations of the term. Not least because they identify neu-
ral components that are assumed to play a crucial functional role in the framework
of the behavior to be explained. But NMDs do not always convey the particular
kind of functional information provided by BA explanations. Speciﬁcally, they may
include reference to brain areas thought to play a crucial functional role in the
mechanism (e.g., the cerebellar cortex) without deﬁning their functional role (e.g.,
inverse control) or refer to the activity of a particular neural group without provid-
ing information on what this activity is thought to represent. As a matter of fact,
neuroscientists often add this kind of functional detail to purely anatomical NMDs
for a range of explanatory or experimental purposes.
13Levy and Bechtel’s (2013) study concerns the relationship between NMDs and
models that “abstract from the structural speciﬁcs of a mechanism and represent
We claim that a better way to deﬁne the difference between the
two kinds of explanation is to say that they each convey different
information (with each abstracting with respect to details of a par-
ticular kind) about the target system, by using different theoretical
vocabularies.
Let us further elaborate on the nature of the details omit-
ted from BA explanations and provided by NMDs, by recall-
ing that Piccinini and Craver (2011) describe BA analyses
as mechanism sketches, which they discuss in the following
terms.
Descriptions of mechanisms [...] can be more or less complete. Incom-
plete models – with gaps, question-marks, ﬁller-terms, or hand-waving
boxes and arrows – are mechanism sketches. Mechanism sketches are
incomplete because they leave out crucial details about how the mech-
anism works. Sometimes a sketch provides just the right amount of
explanatory information for a given context (classroom, courtroom,
lab meeting, etc.). Furthermore, sketches are often useful guides to the
future development of a mechanistic explanation. Yet there remains
a sense in which mechanism sketches are incomplete or elliptical (p.
292).
Now, it is one thing to claim that BA explanations are ellipti-
cal with respect to neuroscientiﬁc mechanism descriptions given
that they do not provide information on the neural areas sub-
serving the various representational roles, but another to claim
that they are elliptical because they “leave out crucial details about
how the mechanism works.” By changing theoretical vocabulary,
and expressing similar regularities in the language of neuroscience,
one does not add crucial details about how the mechanism works:
one simply describes the same boxes with a different vocabulary.
Answers to questions such as “how does system A work?” take the
form of mechanism descriptions; further detail on how system
A works is added by decomposing the mechanism description,
as illustrated in the previous sections, and not by expressing it
with a different vocabulary14. If one knows that the target sys-
tem has a component X, simply deﬁning that component using a
it in a skeletal, coarse-grained manner.” In these models, “the pattern of causal
relations within a system is highlighted, while structural aspects of components
are suppressed” (241). Such models may be sensibly viewed as more abstract than
NMDs, because they are obtained from NMDs by omitting certain sorts of details.
However, we doubt that many BA explanations in the cognitive sciences, includ-
ing the analysis represented in Figure 1, may be classiﬁed as abstract models
of that kind. The reason is that these explanations are obtained from NMDs by
omitting neural details and by adding representational details: they do something
more than representing the pattern of causal relations within the target system.
Indeed, it is possible to formulate an abstract model both of the NMD shown in
Figure 3 and of the BA analysis shown in Figure 1. Suppose, for example, that
a “feedback controller” is deﬁned as a component that generates a motor com-
mand whose intensity, represented by a real number, is inversely proportional
to the intensity of an error, represented by another number, as determined by
coefﬁcient a. Thus the abstract model of this BA component will take the form
y = ax. This abstract model is not the same thing as the BA analysis on which it is
modeled.
14Adding details on how the system works is not the same as providing a better
explanation of the target behavior: the added details could well be irrelevant for
the given explanatory purpose, for reasons not explored here. We wish to main-
tain a neutral position with regard to what decomposition level is the most suitable
for explaining behavior, and with regard to whether only NMDs can explain. Our
sole interest is the relationship between BA analyses and NMDs. For this reason,
we do not comment on the claims made by Levy and Bechtel (2013) and by Pic-
cinini and Craver (2011) in relation to the explanatory power of BA analyses and
NMDs.
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different vocabulary does not enrich the mechanism description
of the system – rather it translates it into another description.
This is not to deny that such a translation may mark impor-
tant progress in the study of the target system, possibly because
it paves the way for the application of additional experimental
techniques. And it is true that sometimes – as in the present case
study – the shift from a functional to a neuroscientiﬁc mech-
anism description is accompanied by a decomposition process.
But this need not be always the case. The point to be empha-
sized is that changing theoretical vocabulary in the description
of a system should be clearly distinguished from the process
of decomposing a model of the system. This distinction, as
already pointed out, has the effect of splitting the question of
the relationship between different models of a system into two
questions: the ﬁrst concerns the relationship between models
expressed using different vocabularies, while the second concerns
the relationship between different levels of the decomposition
hierarchy.
This view has another implication in relation to Piccinini and
Craver’s (2011) claim that BA analyses are mechanism sketches,
that is to say, incomplete or elliptical. Are NMDs mechanism
sketches too? If so, the notion of mechanism sketch would not
help to draw a distinction between BA analyses and NMDs, con-
trary to the main point made by Piccinini and Craver (2011).
It follows that NMDs, for Piccinini and Craver, are not mech-
anism sketches. And the assumption that BA explanations, as
mechanism sketches, are elliptical and incomplete, leads us to
conclude that NMDs are not elliptical nor incomplete, namely,
that they are complete descriptions of a mechanism. It is impor-
tant to be careful and explicit about the sense in which NMDsmay
be deﬁned as such, in order to avoid the strong implication that
NMDs say everything – being complete descriptions – that can be
said about a mechanism (e.g., to avoid the implication that the
mechanism description relating to long-term potentiation used
by Craver, 2002 to illustrate the notion of “mechanism descrip-
tion” says everything about the target mechanism). Here we have
claimed that NMDs may omit information about the represen-
tational roles of the neural structures in the target system and,
that, for this reason, they may sensibly be view as incomplete with
respect to BA explanations.
CONCLUSION
The nature of the relationship between box-and-arrow explana-
tions,whichdonot invokeneuralmechanisms, andneuroscientiﬁc
mechanism descriptions, is a key foundational issue for cognitive
science. On the one hand, the opportunity to disregard neu-
ral details in the explanation of behavior has in the past been
a source of insight and creativity, yielding hypotheses that led
to a better understanding of numerous behavioral and cogni-
tive phenomena. On the other hand, the strong increase in detail
of analysis, both theoretically and experimentally, on the part of
the neurosciences has led to a corresponding increase in the pro-
duction of models whose cognitive signiﬁcance, however, is still
far from clear and unequivocal. In the present article we have
attempted to tackle the question from a foundational viewpoint,
by focusing on the nature of the relationship between box-and-
arrow, non-neural explanations of behavior, and neuroscientiﬁc
mechanism descriptions. On the basis of a case study concerning
motor control, we ﬁrst argued that the regularities formulated
in box-and-arrow explanations and neuroscientiﬁc mechanism
descriptions play a crucial role in justifying any “correspondence”
between the two. The regularities formulated in BA explana-
tions place constraints on the formulation of NMDs, and vice
versa. Then, we made some general claims regarding the simi-
larities and differences between BA analyses and NMDs. As far
as the similarities are concerned, consistently with other posi-
tions expressed in the literature, we argued that both kinds of
explanations describe mechanisms. As far as the differences are
concerned, we suggested that the two kinds of explanation dif-
fer in terms of the theoretical vocabulary used to denote the
entities and properties involved in the mechanism and engag-
ing in regular, mutual interaction. On the basis of the selected
case study we also argued, ﬁrst, that the notion of abstract-
ness, deﬁned as omission of detail, does not help to distinguish
BA analyses from NMDs. BA analyses are more abstract than
NMDs with respect to a particular class of detail, but may be
less abstract with respect to another class of detail. Second, we
argued that the details added into NMDs and missing from in
BA explanations need not necessarily concern how the system
works. Third, we have proposed reasons for doubting that BA
analyses, unlike NMDs, may be considered mechanism sketches.
These views are based on a critical examination of claims made
by Piccinini and Craver (2011) and Levy and Bechtel (2013).
Taken together, they may contribute to further clarifying the rela-
tionship between different styles of explanation widely adopted
in behavioral sciences, and, therefore, to unifying branches
of cognitive science that adopt markedly different theoretical
vocabularies.
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